Private internal reports as evidence in court: The case of Stangeskovene investigation in Norway by Gottschalk, Petter
This file was downloaded from BI Brage,  
the institutional repository (open access) at BI Norwegian Business School 
http://brage.bibsys.no/bi 
 
 
 
 
Petter Gottschalk 
BI Norwegian Business School 
 
 
Private internal reports as evidence in court: The case of Stangeskovene 
investigation in Norway 
 
 
This is the original article as published in 
Pakistan Journal of Criminology 7(2015) 2: 55 -72 
 
 
 
The publisher Pakistan Society of Criminology 
has kindly given their permission to deposit the article open access in  
BI Brage. 
 
 
Publisher’s website: http://www.pakistansocietyofcriminology.com/index.php 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Pakistan Journal of Criminology                             Volume 7, No.2. April 2015, pp. 55 - 72 
 
55 
Private internal reports as evidence in court: The 
case of Stangeskovene investigation in Norway 
Petter Gottschalk 
Abstract 
Fraud examiners, financial crime specialists and counter fraud specialists 
are in the business of private internal investigations for their clients. In the 
case of Stangeskovene in Norway a verdict from Oslo District Court dated 
December 16, 2014,  says that “investigators‟ judgments have limited 
evidentiary value”, and that the court has noted “three fundamental flaws in 
the investigation report”. While investigators nicely concluded that “the 
company disclosure scheme is practiced illegally” and that the investigation 
has “revealed violations of the Shares Act”, Oslo District Court found no 
violations of laws in their three rulings from November and December in 
2014. On the contrary, plaintiffs lost on all accounts as they tried to push 
the investigation report in front of them as evidence in the cases concerning 
shares in Stangeskovene. 
Keywords: private investigation, internal investigation, fraud examiners, 
financial crime specialists. 
Introduction 
Fraud examiners and financial crime specialists are in the business of 
private internal investigations for their clients. A number of studies have 
emphasized the problematic privatization of crime investigations 
(Schneider, 2006; Williams, 2005) and the problematic cooperation with 
regulators and law enforcement (Brooks and Button, 2011; Williams, 
2008). According to Williams (2008), cooperating with the police may 
subject both individuals and the company to the added jeopardy of 
regulatory scrutiny and class action lawsuits, as information revealed to the 
police may be used to support actions in other juridical settings. On the 
positive side we find the emergence of counter fraud specialists (Button et 
al., 2007a, 2007b; Button and Gee, 2013; Tunley et al., 2014) and 
initiatives of voluntary organizations such as ACFE (2014) and CFCS 
(2014).  
The purpose of this article is to explore the importance of private 
investigation reports when presented as evidence in court. The case of 
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Stangeskovene is described and discussed to illustrate how a judge 
considered an investigation report in Norway in December 2014. This 
article provides insights into the often hidden and secret world of private 
investigators.  
 
Financial Crime Specialists 
Private investigators examine facts, causes and responsibilities for negative 
incidents. Their inquiries include fact finding, causality study, change 
proposals and suspect identification. Recent years have seen an increasing 
use of investigation in terms of the assessment of financial irregularities. 
The inquiry form – which primarily takes place in public and private 
companies – aims to uncover failing internal controls and any financial 
incidents such as corruption, embezzlement, tax evasion and other forms of 
economic crime.of economic crime (ACFE, 2014; Button et al., 2007a, 
2007b; Button and Gee, 2013; CFCS, 2014; Machen and Richards, 2004; 
Markopolos, 2010; Morgan and Nix, 2003; Schneider, 2006; Tunley et al., 
2014; Wells, 2003, 2007; Williams, 2005). Private investigators do not 
have the same powers as the police, but they do not have to work according 
to strict guidelines such as the police either. 
A well-known financial crime specialist in the United States is attorney 
Anton R. Valukas. He examined the bankruptcy at Lehman Brothers 
(Valukas, 2010) and the ignition switch ignorance at General Motors 
(Valukas, 2014). 
Background ofStangeskovene Investigation 
Financial crime specialist Elisabeth Roscher at Ernst & Young investigated 
Stangeskovene in Norway, after a court ruled that an investigation into 
sales of shares was claimed by minority shareholder Christen Sveaas. 
Christen Sveaas is a Norwegian businessperson running his own 
investment company Kistefos.  
Roscher is a lawyer and is head of the investigative and forensics team at 
Ernst & Young in Norway. Elisabeth Roscher has worked as a senior 
public prosecutor in economic crime at the Norwegian National Authority 
for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime 
and in the Competition Authority in Norway. She conducted the 
Stangeskovene investigation together with financial crime specialist Helge 
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Skogseth Berg. Berg is a partner at law firm Lynx. He is both a certified 
public accountant as well as a lawyer with experience from Arthur 
Andersen and law firm Thommessen. He has also been a state prosecutor in 
financial crime cases. The report by Roscher and Berg (2013) on the 
Stangeskovene investigation is the subject of this case study.   
As will become evident when reading this case presentation, I supplied 
both parties with my evaluation of the private investigation when Oslo 
District Court handled the case in November 2014. Furthermore, an email 
from a shareholder was approved for publication in this article. 
The story of Stangeskovene starts along the river Tista in the southern part 
of Norway in Halden waterways already in the 1600s – perhaps even 
before. For centuries the family Stang has been linked to forestry and 
timber trade in those waterways. It was only in 1899 that the Stang family‟s 
multifarious activities were collected in one company, and it was Niels 
Anker Stang who stood behind it. When he was 67 years old he wrote a 
letter to his eldest son in law, Dr. Johan Schweigaard, where he expressed a 
desire to leave properties, which then amounted to about 175,000 acers, to 
his sons in law (www.stangeskovene.no).  
Niels Anker Stank had a long-term perspective on their business. His sons 
in law came up with operating models that ensured the development of a 
strong and profitable business. As a foundation were two pillars – a long-
term forest policy and a long-term personnel policy. Later generations and 
leaders of the company have led the legacy. Even during periods of 
increased competition and strongly alternating access to saw logs, the 
company has stayed at its long-term business idea: Stangeskovene is a 
provider of quality wood adapted to market needs 
(www.stangeskovene.no). 
Court Order for an Investigation 
A court order was the basis for the private investigation of Stangeskovene. 
A minority shareholder has the right to ask for a private investigation if 
there are suspicions of misconduct and crime by majority shareholders. 
Minority shareholder Christen Sveaas put forward a request for an 
investigation of Stangeskovene, where the firm by the board opposed 
examination. Romerike District Court ruled on November 2, 2011, that the 
petition for an investigation was not upheld. Sveaas appealed to a higher 
court, and Eidsivating court of appeals ruled on February 12, 2012 that the 
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petition for an investigation was upheld. Attorneys Elisabeth Roscher and 
Helge Skogseth Berg were appointed as examiners (Eidsivating 2013a). 
Furthermore, the court dismissed the case of interfering into the work that 
investigators were doing. 
Later, Stangeskovene denied paying investigators Roscher and Berg close 
to the equivalent of one million US dollars for the investigation. 
Eidsivating (2013b) court of appeals ruled that Stangeskovene had to pay. 
Stangeskovene appealed the decision to Norwegian Supreme Court which 
ruled on May 24, 2012 that the appeal should be dismissed. Attorney 
AsleAarbakke was Stangeskovene‟s defender. Aarbakke tried after the 
defeat in the Supreme Court to ask the district court on December 7, 2012 
for involvement in the investigation to get access to the case and to ensure 
contradiction in connection with the investigation. But the district court 
concluded that the court should not play any active role while the 
investigation was ongoing. Therefore the court could not make any 
decisions regarding transparency or convene the hearing in the 
investigation period, as Aarbakke claimed. 
Stangeskovene appealed this decision on December 19, 2012 to Eidsivating 
court of appeals. As party were given the two investigators Berg and 
Roscher. Both of them pushed back in their own response to the appeal. In 
a writing on January 8, 2013 to the process, declared attorney Anders 
Ryssdal, on behalf of Christen Sveaas, intervention in favor of the two 
investigators, but a few days later the intervention was withdrawn by 
Ryssdal (Eidsivating 2013a, 2013b). The point here is not about details of 
court procedures in Norway, but rather the complicated initiation of as well 
as working environment for the private investigation by Roscher and Berg 
(2013). 
Description of the Stangeskovene Investigation 
Elisabeth Roscher at Ernst & Young law firm and Helge Skogseth Berg at 
Lynx law firm conducted the private investigation of share transactions at 
Stangeskovene. Minority shareholder Christen Sveaas demanded 
investigation (Eidsivating, 2013a, 2013b; Roscher and Berg, 2013). The 
investigation did cost 5.7 million Norwegian kroner (approximately 
900.000 US dollars), with 3 million to Berg and 2.7 million to Roscher. At 
stock judicial scrutiny are only shareholders recipients of the confidential 
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investigation report. I requested access to the report, and shareholder 
Christen Sveaas sent it to me in April 2014. 
The investigators concluded that the dissemination scheme which ensured 
that family got first refusal to 800 shares, was illegal. It represents 20 
percent of the shares in the company. 
The investigation report by Roscher and Berg (2013) of 94 pages seems 
devoid of description of investigation method. There are no competing 
hypotheses or discussion of alternative methods to resolve the mandate. 
The report is primarily a storytelling about stock trades over the last thirty 
years. The conclusion of the investigation is clear enough, that a series of 
offences have occurred, but the conclusion seems poorly documented and 
the documentation is not rooted in analysis. The legal investigation was 
complicated by Stangeskovene directors and majority shareholders, who 
opposed the investigation and opposed the bill from investigators when the 
investigation was complete. When a private investigation is initiated by a 
court order, the investigated firm has to pay the bill from the financial 
crime specialists (Eidsivating, 2013a, 2013b; Riisnæs, 2014a, 2014b). 
The investigators Berg and Roscher (2013) have answered the mandate, 
which among others included to inquire whether current or former boards” 
have acted in violation of the law, the bylaws and/or good business 
practices in connection with the stock trades that were mediated through the 
board or where the board has otherwise been involved in stock trading”. 
Investigators answered yes to the question whether the board has acted 
contrary to and violated laws and regulations. 
In the report of 94 pages, simple storytelling stretches from page 17 to page 
77. Thus the entire 64% of the report is pure reproduction of what has 
happened over the last thirty years. It is know-what in terms of what 
happened, there is little know-how of how it happened, and there is nothing 
about know-why of why it happened. 
First on page 74 appears a sudden utterance from investigators: “It is our 
belief that the real consent in all these incidents had already occurred”. 
Such an expression of opinion inside a long storytelling represents a 
reprehensible presentation in an investigation report. This may seem like a 
trifle, but a professional investigation report develops gradually from 
description of the basis for the investigation, through description of the 
method of investigation, to the reproduction of what has happened, then 
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analysis including expressions of opinion, and then to a final conclusion. 
Such accumulation leads to the ultimate conclusion having great credibility. 
In the process from know-what via know-how to know-why, the 
investigator builds up credibility. Both report and reporters are in need of 
credibility if the client is to follow recommendations from investigators. 
The investigation report contains no hypotheses, neither about facts nor 
about causal relationships. Competing hypotheses could have been used to 
organize storytelling, where anecdotal evidence is assigned to hypotheses, 
as described by Brightman (2009).An alternative hypothesis to the 
dominating influence of economic profit as causality might be a controlling 
influence for the correct interpretation of Stang‟s last will as causality. That 
is, the motive of board members‟ actions might be Stang‟s will, rather than 
personal profit from keeping shares within the family. 
In the absence of alternative reasoning, the investigation report on pages 
77-88 is probably to be considered more as a subjective rather than 
objective investigation result. Objectivity is difficult, but investigators are 
to work just as hard to prove innocence as to prove guilt. That is a basic 
requirement in all investigations to reconstruct the past where named 
individuals are involved. More credible would therefore investigators have 
appeared if they had presented explanatory models and analyzed alternative 
cause-and-effect relationships for the board‟s handling of purchases and 
sales below market price. The impression of subjectivity is enhanced by an 
interview with Sveaas being reproduced uncritically on page 81. The 
interview addresses key topics such as company value and investor 
expertise without presenting alternative views or discussion of Sveaas‟ 
views. 
The legal opinions starting on page 86 is a series of conclusions, totaling 9 
conclusions. The conclusions are drawn without anchoring in previous 
story telling. The conclusions emerge as bombastic, such as “the chairman 
has violated his duty”, “the share trading penal code for equality principle 
is violated”, and “the mediation scheme has led to abuse of position”. The 
scarce evidence for these claims is spread in the storytelling. A better 
organization of the report would be to collect episodes that both support 
and do not support each conclusion. This would make the investigation 
report more credible. For example, here are several episodes that support 
the allegation that “the chairman has violated his duty”, but there also 
seems to be episodes that supports an alternative claim that the chairman 
did not violate his duty. Hence, investigators should have answered 
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questions like: What characterizes situations where the chairman has 
violated his duty? 
The point here is that the clear, but unfounded, conclusions and thus 
answers to the mandate would have greater credibility if the investigation 
report was built up in a more convincing way. If investigators had doubted 
and discussed their way through to conclusions, they would have been able 
to dismiss some objections along the way. If investigators also had 
presented and discussed episodes where duties and principles were not 
violated, then remaining episodes of likely violations could appear more 
clearly. 
Evaluation of the Investigation 
On this basis, the investigation report got the grade D on a scale from A 
(excellent) to F (failure) in my evaluation of investigation reports. This 
grade is based on 3 points for initiation, 2 points for work, 2 points for 
result, and 3 points for consequence on a scale from 4 (excellent) to 1 
(poor). My evaluation is as follows: 
A. Initiation. The starting point was clarified through the court decision to 
conduct a private investigation. The mandate was quite clear but not 
sufficiently clear. 3 points. 
B. Work. The work process is characterized by random document 
collection rather than reflection. Examiners may have been affected by 
tunnel vision, where you only find what you are looking for, namely 
breaches of rules and principles. 2 points. 
C. Result. Work result in the form of an investigation report is 
characterized by storytelling rather than methodological analysis and 
discussion. 2 points. 
D. Consequence. Based on the investigation, shareholders went to lawsuits 
against company directors. While Christen Sveaas sued for missing 
opportunity to buy shares, the family Hauge initiated a lawsuit for lack 
of market price by sales. 
The investigation report concludes on page 94 that “the mediation scheme 
has resulted in board members Niels Selmer Schweigaard, Niels Thomas 
Burchardt and Carl Heber in their periods as directors were disqualified to 
participate in all cases of stock broking in the investigation period”. 
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Examiners believe a number of offenses have taken place. Therefore, 
Sveaas and family members sued the company. The question whether 
Sveaas would gain support for his requirement of cancellation of share 
trades was to be decided in Oslo District Court in November 2014. 
That the board would avoid arousing “small sleeping bears – shareholders” 
Roscher and Berg, 2013: 21) will probably be used in court by plaintiffs to 
prove that the directors went far beyond their powers. The plaintiffs will 
probably emphasize in court the offense perspective that investigators have 
used. Perhaps defendants will present Stangeskovene in a larger historical 
context, where the company was supposed to continue as a family business. 
Plaintiffs will reject his context, because the family company opened up for 
others already in 1947, and Kistefos, Sveaas‟ company, bought its first 100 
shares in 1951. Christen Sveaas personally purchased his first shares in 
1980. 
Christen Sveaas as plaintiff may refer to the Supreme Court (Høyesterett, 
2013: 6) when he thinks it is wrong to argue that Stangeskovene should be 
viewed in a larger historical context, where the company was supposed to 
continue as a family business: 
It is Sveaas‟ missing connection to the Stang family that is the real 
reason why the board refused consent. This is reflected in the 
reasoning of pointing out that Stangeskovene is considered to be a 
family company. … This is clearly unfair. 
Sveaas‟ defense lawyer in the trial was attorney Anders Ryssdal in law firm 
Wiersholm. Sveaas received by an appeal court‟s decision legal costs for 
both district court and court of appeal. For Supreme Court work, attorney 
Ryssdal as paid one million Norwegian kroner from Stangeskovene, which 
was the losing party (Høyesterett, 2013). 
The investigation of Stangeskovene cost 5.7 million Norwegian kroner, 
which is almost equivalent to one million US dollars. At an hourly rate of 
about four thousand Norwegian kroner, it becomes 1425 hours. One might 
ask what all those hours have gone into. A possible answer is that the 
mapping of all stock trades in the last thirty years is laborious, because the 
company in general and the board in particular did neither have an 
overview nor wanted to assist the examiners. Therefore, investigators did 
probably have to spend a lot of time to detect and describe each single 
  
 
 
 
 
Pakistan Journal of Criminology   63
 
stock transaction. However, if stock transactions were easily accessible for 
investigators, then the hour consumption seems quite unreasonably high. 
One of the merit‟s fundamental documents was the letter from the board at 
Stangeskovene to shareholders on March 12, 1947, in connection with an 
entirely new constitution for the company. Pre-emptive rights for the 
family and the board were repealed. This opened the company up for 
external shareholders, and the first one came in 1949. Kistefos came in 
1951. Later ship-owner Jørgen L. Lorentzen came with a large share 
fraction purchased from LauritzLegangerStang. Today, Sveaas owns most 
of the externally owned shares. 
Court Trial Based on Investigation Report 
The investigators concluded that the dissemination scheme which ensured 
that family got first refusal to 800 shares, was illegal. It represents 20 
percent of the shares in the company. Sveaas sued directors and family 
shareholders based on the investigation report. He demanded the annulment 
of equity trades, which were mediated by the board through thirty years 
from 1980 to 2011 (Riisnæs, 2014a). Also family shareholders felt cheated 
and went to litigation, because the investigation showed that directors 
bought their shares far below the price Sveaas was willing to pay (Riisnæs, 
2014b). 
Christen Sveaas was disappointed with my evaluation of the investigation 
report. I received the report from him in April 2014 and sent it to him one 
month later. He invited me out to one of his personally owned restaurants 
in Oslo to discuss my evaluation. He disagreed strongly on several 
accounts, but said it would be up to the court later that year to decide how 
much emphasis should be placed on the conclusions from investigators 
Roscher and Berg (2014). Christen Sveaas, who is one of Norway‟s richest 
persons, is a self-made business entrepreneur, and a colorful person, so an 
evening in his restaurant was indeed an interesting experience.  
The trial went in Oslo District Court in November 2014. Billionaire 
Christen Sveaas (58) meant the board at Stangeskovene had driven illegal 
stock broking for three decades. He demanded shares and compensation. 
Attorney Anders Ryssdal at Wiersholm was his council, while attorney 
Alex Borch at Hjort was council for the family defendants. Sveaas 
demanded to get 500-600 Stangeskovene shares at cost price without 
addition of interests and with deduction of dividends paid. Sveaas wanted 
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to pay the original sellers the selling price plus compensation, according to 
the lawsuit. 
Sveaas argued in court that the owners on the board used company cash to 
secure inexpensive shares for themselves (Kleppe, 2014a: 24): 
-The company uses its own funds to finance family share purchases. 
It is a criminal offence in my view, and extremely rough. It should 
not be possible, and it is contrary to the Shares Act. Here the family 
enjoyed free access to financing of share acquisitions over time and 
accumulated shares without others being knowledgeable about it. 
Excuse me, therefore, one just does not do things like that, said 
Christen Sveaas when he testified before the Oslo District Court on 
Tuesday afternoon. 
One of the events not detected by financial crime specialists Roscher and 
Berg (2013) was that shares were bought at the price of NOK 36 000, while 
Christen Sveaas two months later offered NOK 50 000. This incident was 
raised by selling shareholders, and first declined by purchasing 
shareholders (board members and their related), but this transaction was 
later transformed through a settlement. 
Ending of Stangeskovene Case  
Oslo District Court was to decide in a civil law suit whether Christen 
Sveaas as one of the shareholders had been prevented from buying more 
shares in Stangeskovene because of illegal actions on the part of board 
members at Stangeskovene. The case was presented to the court in 
November 2014. Investor Christen Sveaas was defended by attorney 
Anders Ryssdal from law firm Wiersholm, while the three board members 
were defended by attorney Alex Borch from law firm Hjort. The three 
defendant board members were Niels Selmer Schweigaard, Niels Thomas 
Burchardt and Carl Heber. 
Attorney Borch read from my evaluation of the investigation report by 
Roscher and Berg (2013) in court. He included both some of my general 
views on private investigations as well specific criticism of the 
investigation of the Stangeskovene. The three board members found this to 
be very useful for them, because it strengthened their claim that the 
investigation was one-sided and unbalanced.  
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In an email to me the same evening, Niels Selmer Schweigaard 
(niels.schweigaard@gmail.com) wrote: 
Date: 17/11/201410:08 p.m. 
Subject: Criticism ofthe investigation reportin the 
book"Strategicexamination" 
Hi 
  We experiencedthe investigationas asubstantialabuse.There was 
nowillingness to listento ourpresentation.Explanationsthat 
wouldstrengthenour cause,for exampleauditor, was just droppedby 
investigators, and a value assessment of forest values was obtained by 
investigators without contact with either the board or the administration. 
The assessment built therefore on wrong data and became misleading. I 
tried on two occasions to get the courts to intervene, but it did not succeed. 
The layout of the report reflects that investigators had made up their minds. 
Despite the fact that we sent 12 pages of comments, our views are barely 
referenced. Investigators have relied on “bombastic” allegations without 
any discussion of how the facts are assessed against their conclusions, and 
the factors that strengthen our arguments. 
It was therefore both a relief – and a significant strengthening of our 
argument that an independent and external person had pointed at the 
report’s untenable weaknesses. 
Thank you for your help, we are now awaiting judgment. It is well every 
reason to believe that it will be appealed if it goes against him. 
Sincerely 
Niels Schweigaard 
Christen Sveaas lost on all counts in Oslo District Court. All the defendants 
were acquitted: IngeborgKnutsdatterAstrup, Alyson Lin Burchardt, Ellen 
Cathrine Burchardt, Katy Merete Burchardt, Niels Thomas Burchardt, Per 
Burchardt, Stine Marguerite Burchardt, Thomas Sigurd Burchardt, Carl 
Rasch Heber, Carl Johan Astrup Heber, and Niels Selmer. In the court 
document, the private investigation report by Roscher and Berg (2013) is 
considered to have limited value as evidence (Oslo tingrett, 2014a). 
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The court noted three fundamental errors in the investigation report 
concerning the mediation scheme for shares that was practiced in 
Stangeskovene (Oslo tingrett, 2014a: 23): 
Firstly, a description is given that covers the entire investigation 
period without nuance in time, secondly, it is assumed that inquiries 
from selling shareholders were forwarded to the board at 
Stangeskovene, and finally that it is assumed that the chairman 
orally raised the issue of dissemination within or outside board 
meetings. 
In a parallel court hearing in Oslo District Court, the judge commented as 
follows on the investigation report (Oslo tingrett, 2014b: 18): 
The mandate for the investigation was unnecessarily extensive, both 
the long period of 31 years and the various topics such as inherit 
transitions, gifts and impartiality. For several of the years 
investigated, there were no findings. Large parts of the investigation 
report concern or detect circumstances that are not blameworthy. 
Four family shareholders were first sued by Stangeskovene, but two of 
them signed a settlement. The remaining case was to be prosecuted in Oslo 
District Court the following month of December 2014. 
Attorney Alex Borch said to daily Norwegian newspaper 
„DagensNæringsliv‟ after the verdict that Christen Sveaas has caused 
expenses for Stangeskovene of 3,4 million kroner to achieve 326.000 
kroner in compensation. Stangeskovene‟s attorney was Sven Eriksrud, and 
Sveaas‟ attorney was Anders Ryssdal (Kleppe, 2014b). 
A third and final verdict from district courts in the Stangeskovene legal 
matters was passed in Oslo District Court as scheduled in the month of 
December 2014. Again, the case was dismissed, and Niels Selmer 
Schweigaard and the others won in court. In the verdict of 25 pages (Oslo 
tingrett, 2014c), it says about the investigation report by Roscher and Berg 
(2013): 
 The investigators judgments have limited value as evidence. 
 There are three fundamental errors in the investigation report: there 
is no differentiation in time, it is assumed that the board was 
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informed, and it is assumed that the chairman discussed issues in 
board meetings. 
This is interesting in light of the fact that Roscher and Berg (2013) 
concluded that their investigation has proved that the company‟s disclosure 
scheme was practiced illegally, and that abuse of positions in the company 
had occurred. 
After the verdicts in Oslo District Court, I wrote the following note for the 
Norwegian daily business newspaper “DagensNæringsliv” in late 
December 2014, under the heading “Private Investigators Astray”: 
Private investigations of suspected economic crime have become 
profitable consulting business for auditing firms and law firms. The 
client points at what should be investigated (the mandate), and 
investigators draw firm conclusions that satisfy clients. Often 
innocent victims of miscarriage of justice emerge in this process. It 
happened for example in the investigation of the Moscow School, 
Briskeby Stadium, and Hadeland and Ringerike Broadband. 
Now there is a verdict from Oslo District Court dated December 16, 
where it says that “investigators‟ judgments have limited 
evidentiary value”, and that the court has noted “three fundamental 
flaws in the investigation report”. While investigators nicely 
concluded that “the company disclosure scheme is practiced 
illegally” and that the investigation has “revealed violations of the 
Shares Act”, Oslo District Court found no violations of laws in their 
three rulings from November and December this year. On the 
contrary, plaintiffs lost on all accounts as they tried to push the 
investigation report in front of them as evidence in the cases 
concerning shares in Stangeskovene. 
Unfortunately, there are many private investigators that are 
constantly astray. This is bad, because the trust in private 
investigators – especially if they call themselves lawyers – is still 
quite high. There is an acute need for quality control and 
certification of these people, before they impact more innocent 
victims. 
As Schweigaard suggests in his email to me, it is likely that the district 
court decision will be appealed, so the case goes on.  
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Discussion 
This article is different from traditional research papers in many respects. 
First, the article has introduced the issue of private internal investigation 
reports in terms of quality and relevance for court decisions as exemplified 
in the case of Stangeskovene investigation.Next, an example of an 
investigator is Anton Valukas, although he is not involved in the case. 
Third, I introducemyself as an actor in the case in terms of grounded 
research. It does not make me a party in the case, asI provided both parties 
with a personal evaluation of the investigation report. Obviously, my 
evaluation reached the same conclusion as the court eventually did – that 
the evaluation was not of a relevance and quality to help win the case for 
the plaintiffs – which was already made public as a judgment before the 
trial in court. 
Fourth, the legal wrangling leading up to the investigation is presented. 
This part may be difficult to understand for non-Norwegian non-jurists, and 
it is thus concluded that the point of presenting it was not about details of 
court procedures in Norway. Fifth, I presented in this article my negative 
evaluation of the report and its results, including point markings. The latter 
part of my evaluation presents different facts from the trial. This part might 
have been difficult to follow for someone who is not intimate with the case. 
Fifth, it was important to deal with the price of this investigation. 
Sixth, my grounded research is further exemplified by mentioning the 
dinner invitation by the plaintiff to one of his personally owned restaurants, 
and that it was indeed an interesting experience. Another example is the 
email from one of the defendants where I am thanked for my help with 
pointing out the report‟s untenable weaknesses. 
Finally, the different court rulings are cited and shown to substantiate my 
views, as the investigation report is deemed invalid. I also added a note 
published in a business newspaper where I am interviewed, to illustrate the 
subjective and explorative nature of my research.  
Based on all these characteristics, there is indeed a need for further research 
to reveal the hidden and secret world of private investigators. 
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Conclusion 
A number of issues, dilemmas, problems and challenges in private 
investigations are important to explore in order to understand the business 
of financial crime specialists. Their hidden world is problematic. It was 
Williams (2005) and Schneider (2006) who first described and discussed 
problems related to privatizing economic crime enforcement and 
governance of private policing of financial crime. Since their research one 
decade ago, few of the problems they identified have been solved. Rather, 
the forensic accounting and corporate investigation industry has grown 
rapidly without any signs of effective regulation or self-regulation. 
Exceptions include the emergence of the counter fraud specialist in the 
United Kingdom (Button et al., 2007a, 2007b; Button and Gee, 2013) and 
the works of voluntary organizations such as ACFE (2014) and CFCS 
(2014). 
In the case of Stangeskovene in Norway a verdict from Oslo District Court 
dated December 16, 2014,  says that “investigators‟ judgments have limited 
evidentiary value”, and that the court has noted “three fundamental flaws in 
the investigation report”. While investigators nicely concluded that “the 
company disclosure scheme is practiced illegally” and that the investigation 
has “revealed violations of the Shares Act”, Oslo District Court found no 
violations of laws in their three rulings from November and December in 
2014. On the contrary, plaintiffs lost on all accounts as they tried to push 
the investigation report in front of them as evidence in the cases concerning 
shares in Stangeskovene. 
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